Context in cognitive psychology of reasoning

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dc.creatorGarcía Campos, Jonatan
dc.creatorSarabia López, Saúl
dc.date2019-10-16
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-18T13:38:31Z
dc.date.available2020-02-18T13:38:31Z
dc.descriptionThe work we present aims to clarify what is a context in the cognitive psychology of reasoning. Although the term context is found in the literature of different cognitive psychologists, we will argue that there is no clear analysis of what should be understood by that term. We will defend that the notion of context refers to different ideas, that is, the content, the format, the perspective, the nature of the logical contents and the environment of the problems. We will suggest that while these ideas may have overlaps, it is unclear that content, format, perspective, nature of logical content and environment are equivalent notions. Making these distinctions, we will argue, can not only help you understand what a context means, but it can also help you better understand the debates about how we humans reason or how we should reason.en-US
dc.descriptionEl trabajo que presentamos tiene como objetivo clarificar qué es un contexto en la psicología cognitiva del razonamiento. A pesar de que el término contexto se encuentra en la literatura de distintos psicólogos cognitivos, argumentaremos que no existe un análisis claro de qué se debe entender por ese término. Defenderemos que la noción de contexto hace referencia a distintas ideas, esto es, al contenido, al formato, a la perspectiva, a la naturaleza de los contenidos lógicos y al ambiente de los problemas. Sugeriremos que si bien estas ideas pueden tener traslapes, es poco claro que contenido, formato, perspectiva, naturaleza de los contenidos lógicos y ambiente sean nociones equivalentes. Hacer estas distinciones, argumentaremos, no sólo puede ayudar a entender qué significa un contexto, sino además puede ayudar a comprender de mejor manera los debates en torno a cómoes que los seres humanos razonamos o cómo debemos razonar.es-ES
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.libertadores.edu.co/index.php/TesisPsicologica/article/view/929
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11371/2467
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherFundación Universitaria Los Libertadoreses-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.libertadores.edu.co/index.php/TesisPsicologica/article/view/929/899
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dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2019 Tesis Psicológicaes-ES
dc.sourceTesis Psicológica; Vol. 13 Núm. 2 (2018): Cognición Comparada; 1-22es-ES
dc.source2422-0450
dc.source1909-8391
dc.titleContext in cognitive psychology of reasoningen-US
dc.titleContexto en psicología cognitiva del razonamientoes-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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